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TO THE FRONT OF THE LINE: SPURRING BIOTECH 
COLLABORATION THROUGH PATENT FAST-TRACK 
EXAMINATION VOUCHERS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The current incentive behind patent law with respect to biotechnology 
research may be falling short of its constitutional basis.1  The possibility of 
data secrecy and upstream over-patenting may be creating an 
“anticommons” that strangles downstream research and development. 2  
Instead of focusing on statutory changes to the patent law, an incentive 
program by the United States Patent and TradeOffice (“USPTO”) that 
encourages voluntary data sharing and open use of research tools by 
granting fast-track examination and reexamination vouchers might be a 
novel solution to combat the possible anticommons and help “promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts” in the realm of biotechnology 
research.3  The Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (“ADNI”) will be 
reviewed as a model for the benefits of data sharing and collaboration. 
This Comment will elaborate on this proposal by first introducing the 
ADNI as a foundation for the benefits, goals and necessities of data sharing 
in biotechnology research in Part II.4  Part III of this Comment will give an 
overview of patent law and purposes.5  Part IV will discuss the Bayh-Dole Act 
and its influence on university research and patent practices.6  Part V will 
discuss the “Theory of the Anticommons,” investigating its possible existence 
and impact on biotechnology research.7  Part VI reviews past proposed 
solutions to reduce the occurrence and impact of an anticommons on 
biotechnology research.8  Part VII gives an overview and criticisms of the 
FDA priority review voucher system.9  Part VIII reviews the USPTO proposal 
of a humanitarian reexamination voucher program and will propose 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Under an anticommons, multiple owners hold exclusionary rights in a scarce resource 
to such a degree that others cannot effectively use the resource.  See infra Part V.A. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See infra Part V. 
 8. See infra Part VI. 
 9. See infra Part VII. 
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expansion of this proposal to include patent incentives for entering into data 
and research collaboration efforts.10  Finally, Part IX concludes that a fast-
track examination voucher awarded to qualifying researchers who 
participate in an open data and research tool collaboration could be an 
efficient incentive mechanism to overcome a possible biotechnology 
anticommons through voluntary participation.11 
II.  ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE NEUROIMAGING INITIATIVE (ADNI) AND DATA SHARING 
In August of 2010 the beneficial results of a new way of conducting 
large scale biomedical research came to light.12  Seven years prior, in 
2003, scientists and high-level officials from the National Institutes of 
Health, the Food and Drug Administration, universities and non-profit 
organizations, along with the pharmaceutical and medical imaging 
industries joined forces in an unprecedented, “collaborative effort to find the 
biological markers that show the progression of Alzheimer’s disease in the 
human brain.”13  Thus the ADNI was born.14 
What made the collaboration so unique and ambitious was not only its 
goal of tackling Alzheimer’s but also the agreement to “share all the data, 
making every single finding public immediately, available to anyone with a 
computer anywhere in the world.”15  Since no other research is conducted 
under a similar premise, the fact that no single entity could own the data or 
file patent applications was “worrisome” to some scientists.16  Many feared 
that with open, public ownership of the data, less experienced researchers 
could “misinterpret it and publish information that was wrong.”17  However, 
as stated by Dr. John Q. Trojanowski, one collaborative researcher from the 
University of Pennsylvania, “we all realized that we would never get 
biomarkers unless all of us parked our egos and intellectual-property noses 
outside the door and agreed that all of our data would be public 
immediately.”18  While the data would be shared, the profit incentive 
remained through the ability of private entities to file patent applications on 
any resulting drugs or diagnostic tests.19 
 
 10. See infra Part VIII. 
 11. See infra Part IX. 
 12. Gina Kolata, Rare Sharing of Data Led to Results on Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
13, 2010, at A1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Kolata, supra note 12. 
 18. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 19. Id. 
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The collaboration offered a win-win situation to all involved parties.  
Prior to the initiative, researchers and pharmaceuticals were trapped in a 
“prisoner’s dilemma”;20 everyone “wanted to move the field forward, but no 
one wanted to take the risks of doing it.”21  With large data sets requiring 
800 subjects, the task was too large for any single entity to tackle.22  
Furthermore, developing robust and valid tests for the disease offered “such 
limited returns on the investment that it was in no one company’s interest to 
pursue it.”23 
The ADNI has already been the model for a similar research initiative 
sponsored by the Michael J. Fox Foundation in the search for Parkinson’s 
biomarkers.24  However, some argue that freely published scientific data, 
resources, and “technological prospect[s]” will lead to “‘chaotic, duplicative, 
and wasteful’ effort.”25  A counter viewpoint suggests that an absence of 
openness will lead researchers to “unknowingly build on something less than 
the total accumulation of scientific knowledge or work on problems already 
solved.”26  While there are differing opinions on both sides regarding data 
sharing and openness, this Comment recognizes the widespread benefits of 
such a voluntary research model.  This Comment proposes the ADNI model 
as a method of attack for many large scale human diseases.  By pooling 
resources and disclaiming intellectual property rights in the collaborative 
results, the investment risks can be reduced.  The downstream costs of using 
open, freely available data and research methods are essentially eliminated.  
This Comment expands upon a recent USPO proposal discussed in Part VIII 
to include fast-track patent examination vouchers for collaborating partners 
as an incentive to share data and advance scientific research.  It is 
advanced that such a pull mechanism, operating on the voluntary 
participation of collaborating researchers is a more balanced approach to 
possible stagnation or anticommons in the biotechnology field than some of 
the more radical proposed solutions.27 
 
 20. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 21. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 22. Kolata, supra note 12. 
 23. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 
659, 670 (2004). 
 26. Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a 
National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 473 (2002). 
 27. See infra Part VI. 
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III.  OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW AND IMPACTS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY 
RESEARCH 
Patent protection in the United States finds its roots in the U.S. 
Constitution.28  Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 states that Congress shall 
have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”29 In the absence of patent law, 
“copyists may easily free-ride on the efforts of inventors” leading to a market 
failure with a dearth of invention.30 Therefore patent law incentivizes 
inventive activity and disclosure by giving patent holders, or patentees, the 
right to exclude others from practicing, making, selling or offering to sell, 
and importing the patented invention.31 This limited monopoly currently 
extends for twenty years from the filing date,32 making the time between 
filing and patent issue critical to the length of protection and the amount of 
investment return.33 Theoretically, the patent law would be the “most 
efficient mechanism to incentivize invention . . . while at the same time 
ensuring the existence of a public domain upon which additional inventions 
may be built.”34  In practice, however, the current patent system “may create 
roadblocks to the development of commercial applications, particularly 
when applied to a new technology, such as biotechnology.”35 
To receive patent protection an invention must be novel,36 have some 
utility37 and must be non-obvious.38  Further, the law grants protection to a 
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof.”39  Absent from the realm of patentable subject 
matter are “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”40  The 
law views such principles as “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all 
 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 30. Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the 
Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 144 
(2004). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
 33. Caroline A. Crenshaw, Patents and Patients: Who Is the Tragedy of the Anticommons 
Impacting and Who Is Bearing the Cost of High-Priced Biotechnological Research?, 9 MINN. J. 
L. SCI. & TECH. 913, 916 (2008) (citing Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Research Serv., RL33159, 
Influenza Antiviral Drugs and Patent Law Issue 6 (2005)). 
 34. Mireles, supra note 30, at 144. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 37. Id. § 101. 
 38. Id. § 103. 
 39. Id. § 101. 
 40. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
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men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”41  However, such 
inputs, including raw data, to patentable subject matter are closely 
guarded42 and it is the intent of this Comment to encourage the sharing of 
such inputs. 
In the 1980s, the courts took a major step in advancing the 
biotechnology research and development field by pushing for “privatization 
of medical research and patent protection of new discoveries and treatment 
methods.”43  With the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, living matter was held to be patentable subject matter within 
the ambit of §101.44  The Court granted protection to the respondent’s 
micro-organism because it was a “nonnaturally occurring manufacture of 
composition of matter – a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive 
name, character [and] use.’”45  Reading the patent statutes broadly,46 the 
Court recognized that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.”47  This decision, along with 
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (discussed in Part III) laid the foundation 
for the biotechnology industry.48 
In the thirty years since Chakrabarty was decided, the biotechnology 
research and development industry has taken off.  However, an early 2010 
United States District Court of New York decision49 appeared to put on the 
brakes in the realm of gene patenting. In Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office (also known as the 
Myriad case), the Court held that the breast cancer gene sequences, BRCA1 
and BRCA2, are unpatentable subject matter since the 
[The] DNA’s existence in an “isolated” form alters neither [the physical 
embodiment of biological information] of DNA as it exists in the body nor 
the information it encodes.  Therefore, the patents at issue directed to 
“isolated DNA” containing sequences found in nature are unsustainable as 
a matter of law and are deemed unpatentable subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.50 
On July 29, 2011 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit overruled in part the District Court Myriad ruling, holding that such 
 
 41. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 42. See infra Part V.B. 
 43. Crenshaw, supra note 33, at 917. 
 44. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1979). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 308. 
 47. Id. at 309 (internal quotations omitted). 
 48. Mireles, supra note 30, at 143. 
 49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 50. Id. at 185. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
346 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:341 
isolated gene sequences are in fact patentable subject matter under § 
101.51 Since the isolated DNA sequences at issue “have a distinctive 
chemical identity and nature” that is “markedly different” from naturally 
occurring molecules, they should be afforded patent protection.52 Falling in 
line with Chakrabarty’s “anything under the sun that is made by man” 
language, the Federal Circuit found that the method of “cleaving or 
synthesizing a portion of native chromosomal DNA imparts” a new and 
distinct identity wholly different from the native DNA.53 
Interestingly, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) reversed its long held 
position on the patentability of isolated gene sequences in its amicus brief 
filing for the Myriad case on October 29, 2010 with the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.54  In that brief, the Government stated that “isolated 
but otherwise unaltered” genes should not be patentable because they are 
elements of nature, thus falling outside the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101.55  
This position runs counter to the decade’s old policy within the USPTO of 
granting patents, in addition to the synthetic DNA sequences seen in 
Chakrabarty, to isolated, naturally occurring gene sequences.56  Such gene 
sequences are “genomic material excised from an organism’s genome and 
isolated from the cellular environment in which it normally occurs, but 
without material change to its naturally occurring chemical structure and 
function.”57  The filing notes that the USPTO sees even isolated genes as 
non-naturally occurring since they are not found to exist in such an isolated 
manner in nature.58  Proponents of attaching patent rights to isolated gene 
sequences, falling in line with current USPTO policy, disagree with the new 
policy statement.59  Opponents of patentability, arguing in line with the 
DOJ, state that “locking up basic genetic information in patents actually 
impedes medical progress.”60  The government states that this change will 
 
 51. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
No. 11-725, 2012 WL 986819, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 52. Id. at 1351. 
 53. Id. at 1352. 
 54. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18, Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(No. 09-CV-4515) [hereinafter Brief for the United States]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 4. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 5-6. 
 59. Andrew Pollack, In a Policy Reversal, U.S. Says Genes Should Not Be Eligible for 
Patenting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, at B1. 
 60. Id. 
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have little impact on the genetic sciences, since human manipulations of 
genetic sequences will still be afforded patent protection.61 
If the Federal Circuit had followed the reasoning of the United States 
and upheld the District Court’s ruling the biotechnology research and 
development industry could have been seriously damaged. With the 
biotechnology field encompassing a large area of the national economy, a 
sweeping invalidation of many patents that form its foundation would have 
been highly detrimental to the economy as a whole.  However if the District 
Court ruling had been upheld, it could be argued that putting isolated 
genes within the public domain could overcome an anticommons problem 
in the biotechnology industry.62  The question of patenting genetic materials 
remains unanswered because on March 26, 2012, the Supreme Court 
vacated the Federal Circuit holding in Myriad in light of its 9-0 decision in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.63 
IV.  PASSAGE OF BAYH-DOLE ACT 
Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, the federal government 
realized that commercialization of government-funded innovations would 
require massive investment; however “private firms were unwilling to invest 
in commercializing innovations unless those firms received a proprietary 
interest in the end product.”64  Therefore to increase commercialization, “the 
government determined that technology developed with government funds 
should be transferred to the private sector for further research, development, 
and investment . . . .”65  In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act as an 
amendment to the Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980, which 
allowed universities and small companies to retain intellectual property 
rights in the inventions developed through the infusion of government 
funds.66  Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the biotechnology sector 
operated under a commons model, with the federal government funding 
“upstream” research that “encouraged broad dissemination of results in the 
public domain.”67  These unpatented discoveries could be incorporated by 
 
 61. Id.; Brief for the United States, supra note 54, at 11. 
 62. See infra Part V.A. 
 63. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, No. 11-725, 2012 WL 986819, 
at *1 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 64. Mireles, supra note 30, at 158. 
 65. Id. at 158-59. 
 66. Crenshaw, supra note 33, at 917; see generally Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-
211 (2006). 
 67. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
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any developer into “downstream” diagnostic and treatment methods at a 
low transaction cost.68 
As a result of the passage of Bayh-Dole, collaboration between the 
public and private sectors in biotechnology research and development has 
flourished.69  Since the federal government is the largest funding entity for 
university research and development in the United States, the passage of the 
Bayh-Dole Act has had “a tremendous effect on the appropriation of 
technology.”70 Government funds currently account for roughly twenty-six 
percent of all research and development funding in the United States.71  
Further, the government funds nearly sixty percent of all university research 
and development.72  Prior to Bayh-Dole, the rate of commercialization of 
government-funded technologies was only four percent.73  Biotechnology 
patent applications by qualifying entities “increased by more than 300 
percent in the first five years after the enactment of the legislation, as 
compared with the five years prior to the passage of the Act.”74 
By looking at the above numbers, it appears that the Bayh-Dole Act has 
achieved the government’s goals of: avoiding stagnating commercial 
development of government-funded projects by increasing the efficiency of 
transfer “of discoveries that would otherwise languish in government and 
university archives”; reviving U.S. industry through new technology infusions 
“that would enhance productivity and create new jobs”; and keeping 
federally-funded research advances in the U.S. for development by U.S. 
firms.75  However, many critics believe that the emphasis on private 
commercialization of research runs counter to the ultimate knowledge 
seeking purposes of university research.76 Others fear that university 
researchers will be “unduly influence[d]” in their decisions on research 
projects and paths.77  Scientists may have become more competitive and 
less willing to share data that would otherwise spur academic progress out 
of fear of losing intellectual property (IP) rights.78  In essence, the private 
sector may discourage disclosure and publication of research until 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Mireles, supra note 30, at 155. 
 70. Id. at 155-56. 
 71. Id. at 156. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Mireles, supra note 30, at 160-61. 
 75. Id. at 159. 
 76. Id. at 157. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Michael Tomasson, Legal, Ethical, and Conceptual Bottlenecks to the Development of 
Useful Genomic Tests, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 231, 244 (2009). 
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intellectual property rights are secured.79  What may result is a lack of 
foundational research that other researchers can use as a starting point.80  
Under the auspices of increasing collaboration between private industry and 
non-profit organizations, the Bayh-Dole Act has “encouraged an alternative 
university culture which focuses attention on entrepreneurial activities.”81  
Several critics have stated that the Bayh-Dole Act has pushed university 
science too far into a “private competitive model.”82 
V.  THEORY OF THE ANTICOMMONS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
A. Defining the Anticommons 
To understand the tragedy of the anticommons, one must first look to 
the tragedy of the commons.  First theorized by Garrett Hardin in 1968, 
under the “tragedy of the commons” commonly held resources are over-
exploited because no single person has any incentive to conserve the 
property that they alone do not own.83  Michael Heller and Rebecca 
Eisenberg suggest that while such a theory bolsters the argument for private 
property rights, it turns a blind eye to resource underuse when the 
government grants the property right of exclusion to too many.84  What then 
results is an anticommons; where “multiple owners each have a right to 
exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege 
of use.”85 
Following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the privatization of 
biomedical discoveries, Heller and Eisenberg argue, has led to a 
“proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream [that] may be stifling 
life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and 
product development.”86  Accordingly, aggregating the various privately 
held rights in order to advance the science under an anticommons “is often 
brutal and slow.”87 
The anticommons results in “obstacles to future research” because 
privatization has put the rights to prior discoveries in the hands of too 
 
 79. Mireles, supra note 30, at 157. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Tomasson, supra note 77, at 244. 
 82. David E. Winickoff et al., Opening Stem Cell Research and Development: A Policy 
Proposal for the Management of Data, Intellectual Property, and Ethics, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
L. & ETHICS 52, 56 (2009). 
 83. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 698. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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many.88  This has resulted in a “spiral of overlapping patent claims in the 
hands of different owners, reaching ever further upstream in the course of 
biomedical research.”89  These overlapping claims have increased the cost 
of doing business in the biotechnology field because an individual 
researcher “needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single 
useful product.”90  With each required upstream patent comes a toll that the 
individual patent owner can charge the subsequent researcher “slowing the 
pace of downstream biomedical innovation.”91  Beyond slowing the speed 
of biomedical development, this “patent thicket” can give rise to an 
“innovation malaise born of unwillingness on the part of investors to put 
money behind projects because of the uncertainty over whether a cost-viable 
path to market will be found for the new, unproven technology.”92 
Heller and Eisenberg suggest that the government has fostered the 
growth of the anticommons by “creating too many concurrent fragments of 
intellectual property rights” in downstream products or by allowing upstream 
patentees to “stack licenses on top of the future discoveries of downstream 
users.”93 
The market of concurrent fragments began in 1991 when the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) began filing patent applications on “expressed 
sequence tags (ESTs).”94  While the NIH has since ceased this controversial 
path, private entities have picked up the baton with patent filings on DNA 
sequences and gene fragments prior to “identifying a corresponding gene 
protein, biological function, or potential commercial product.”95  If the 
USPTO grants such claims, a wealth of raw inputs into the biotechnology 
research field will be privatized.  Essentially, as more patentees hold rights to 
each gene fragment or cell line, later researchers will be required to pay 
each patentee for access to the elements needed for further drug and 
therapy development.  As researchers encounter more “tollbooth[s] on the 
road to product development” they may find it difficult and time consuming 
to gather the required licenses and are forced to “choose between diverting 
resources to less promising projects with fewer licensing obstacles or 
proceeding to animal and then clinical testing on the basis of incomplete 
information.”96  As a way of navigating the morass of pending rights on 
fragments, research firms and universities enter licensing agreements at a 
 
 88. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 698. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 699. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Winickoff et al., supra note 81, at 73. 
 93. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 699. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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time when “there is substantial uncertainty as to the scope of patent rights 
that will ultimately issue.”97  The patent filing party may have the upper hand 
by contractually securing broader rights than the rights recognized once the 
patent, if ever, is issued, thus “compound[ing] the obstacles to developing 
new products.”98 
Another possible source of a biotech anticommons are stacking licenses 
found in reach through licensing agreements (“RTLAs”).99  The RTLA grants 
the upstream patentee rights to downstream developments, usually in the 
form of royalties on sales, “exclusive or non-exclusive license[s] on future 
discoveries, or an option to acquire such a license.”100  While RTLAs may be 
beneficial to researchers, who can gain immediate access to the patented 
research tools with little upfront cost, they give patentees the upper hand 
through a “continuing right to be present at the bargaining table as a 
research project moves downstream toward product development.”101 
Licensing patents provide financial incentives to patentees; while they 
may not “eliminate downstream appropriation,” they can “retard it through 
the friction of transaction costs.”102  An inefficient market might result due to 
administrative red tape, looming deadlines, and scientists’ relative 
unfamiliarity of patent licensing practices.103  Not only can transaction costs 
significantly increase under an anticommons, there is also a greater 
potential for holdout situations when licenses from multiple patentees have 
to be independently negotiated in order for scientists to move forward down 
a particular research path.104  Under such holdout situations, cognitive 
biases can take hold, leading upstream patentees to overinflate the value of 
their individual patent.105 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 699. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Lee, supra note 25, at 674-75. 
 103. Id. at 675. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 701. Heller and Eisenberg explain the issue as 
such: “Imagine that one of a set of 50 upstream inventions will likely be the key to identifying 
an important new drug, the rest of the set will have no practical use, and a downstream 
product developer is willing to pay $10 million for the set. Given the assumption that no 
owner knows ex ante which invention will be the key, a rational owner should be willing to sell 
her patent for the probabilistic value of $200,000. However, if each owner overestimates the 
likelihood that her patent will be the key, then each will demand more than the probabilistic 
value, the upstream owners collectively will demand more than the aggregate market value of 
their inputs, the downstream user will decline the offers, and the new drug will not be 
developed.”  Id. 
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B. Evidence of Anticommons at Work in Biotechnology Research and 
Development 
Paralleling the theory of the anticommons with regard to biotechnology 
patents is a 2002 study that found that data withholding is prevalent in 
academic genetics.106  Study respondents participating in genetics research 
indicated that they had requested information, data or materials pertaining 
to published research on average of 8.8 times over the previous three years, 
with ten percent of all the requests being denied.107  Forty-seven percent of 
research academics reported that at least one of their requests was denied 
by a fellow academic.108  The top reasons respondents gave for denying 
information, data or material requests were the effort required to produce 
the requested information and the necessity of protecting the researcher’s 
ability to publish.109  Furthermore, researchers stated that engaging in 
commercial endeavors was a key reason for denying a request.110  Nearly 
thirty percent of all geneticists stated that their inability to replicate published 
results was a “direct result of another academic scientist’s unwillingness to 
share information, data, or materials.”111  Data sharing is important within 
the scientific community considering that the same number of respondents 
ended collaborative research because of data withholding.112 A large 
majority feel that such practices are detracting “somewhat or greatly” from 
the level of scientific communication and “slowing the rate of progress in 
their field of science.”113  The study authors comment on the level of 
withholdings, stating 
Data withholding may paradoxically occur most commonly during extremely 
rapid progress, since scientists are generating large numbers of new findings 
that stimulate much jockeying for scientific priority. The commercial 
applications of genetics research, along with increasing dependence on 
industry funding and the rise of commercial norms in the academy, may be 
partially responsible as well for data withholding.114 
The study recognizes a drag on genetic research progress that closed data 
creates, yet there are pushes within the field toward making data sharing 
more prevalent.115 
 
 106. Campbell et al., supra note 26, at 477. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 478. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Campbell, supra note 26, at 478. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 479. 
 115. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] TO THE FRONT OF THE LINE 353 
To accomplish data openness and continued progress in the 
biotechnology fields, the National Human Genome Research Institute 
encourages “rapid release and dissemination of new sequence data by its 
funded investigators.”116  Several journals have also stepped up by making 
publication contingent on the placement of data and materials in public 
depositories or some other broad dissemination mechanism.117  While these 
are promising starts to overcome the anticommons theory and the hurdles 
presented by closed data, the proposed examination voucher program 
could provide the needed incentive to bring forth widespread sharing of 
research data and methods. 
C. Questioning the Existence of an Anticommons 
By incentivizing researchers to share data and patented research tools in 
recognized collaborations, the obstacles of license aggregation, reach 
through costs and speculative valuations can be reduced or eliminated, 
thereby fostering research and development of treatments for complex 
diseases.  However, some commentators question the existence of an 
anticommons in the biotechnology field, or the detriment to innovation 
should one exist.118  Searching for the tragedy of the anticommons is a 
difficult prospect because “the researcher is attempting to prove a 
counterfactual: if something had not happened, then something else would 
have resulted.”119  Those warning of the impacts of the anticommons call for 
drastic solutions to a possible nonexistent problem, such as: strengthening 
the utility requirement, increasing the use of patent pools, granting a more 
generous experimental use defense to patent infringement, and most 
radically recognizing a fair use exception to patent infringement.120  With no 
clear conclusion on whether an anticommons exists, such sweeping changes 
to the patent law could “undermine the incentives provided by patents to 
invent, disclose, and innovate.”121  Since the patent system caters to many 
different technical fields, changing the rules to correct for possible 
deficiencies in one sector could have unintended consequences in myriad 
others.  The biotechnology industry, as with all industries where capital 
investment is critical, “requires stable and strong property rights to justify 
investment in research and development.”122 
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After a thorough empirical study of the biotechnology landscape in the 
United States, David Adelman found that there is “little evidence that recent 
growth in biotechnology patenting is threatening innovation.”123  The study 
comprised 52,000 United States granted biotechnology patents from 
January 1990 through December 2004.124  While Heller and Eisenberg 
suggest that concurrent fragment ownership is a cause of an 
anticommons,125  this study found that biotechnology patent ownership is 
diffuse, with the largest companies obtaining fewer than thirty biotechnology 
patents per year on average.126  Further, there has been a steady increase in 
the number of entities obtaining patents in the biotechnology field.127  Such 
a “continuous record of new market entrants” and the absence of 
concentrated control lend weight to the argument that “biotechnology 
patenting is not adversely affecting innovation.”128  The Adelman study 
posits that the current debate has “morphed the anticommons theory into 
one that associates rising patent numbers almost inexorably with patent 
anticommons, transforming Heller and Eisenberg’s contextually delimited 
theory into a generalized model premised on a relatively simple relationship 
existing between patent counts and transaction costs.”129  The study 
questions the “assumption that upstream patents will inevitably restrict 
access to essential research tools for which no alternatives exist,” and finds 
the “generalized anticommons theory” to be “empirically elusive.”130 
The Adelman study looks to the rise and fall of patent applications as 
one factor to determine the presence of an anticommons.131  The study 
found that in 1998 biotechnology patent issuances per year peaked at 
5,977 and by 2004 that rate had decreased by twenty-nine percent to 
4,324 per year.132  The study suggests that such a decrease could be seen 
as the generalized anticommons theory at work; “a drop in innovative 
output [after 1999] brought about by the fragmenting effects of thousands 
of patents . . . on research and development” could be seen as the point 
where “spiraling licensing costs” tipped the scales against the incentives to 
patent.133  However, the study looks deeper, noting that the number of 
patent applications filed (versus patents issued) for “biotechnology patents 
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rose substantially post 1999.”134  This observation pierces a hole in the 
anticommons theory.135 
While the study looks to economic factors,136 it finds more influence in 
the USPTO changes.137 First, the study acknowledges a move within the 
patent office to a stronger utility requirement as an explanation of the 
“dramatic leveling off of biotechnology patenting.”138  Such a change could 
account for the lengthened prosecution time and the increase of denials 
after 1999.139  Suggesting not an anticommons at work, but a more fine 
toothed comb, “the number of biotechnology patent applications filed with 
the PTO increased by about forty percent while the number of . . . patents 
issued declined by almost thirty percent.”140 
The study further weakens the anticommons theory by evaluating two 
strong transient influences on the declining patent rates.  The first identified 
factor is the June 1995 change in patent term from seventeen years from 
issue to twenty years from filing that caused a spike in biotechnology patent 
applications, with 4,602 filings in 1994, 7,626 in 1995, and 4,045 in 
1996.141  The second, and more revealing, transient factor regarding the 
“falloff in the number of biotechnology patents issued likely reflects a 
saturation of examiner resources.”142  With only a finite number of patent 
examiners dedicated to the growing biotechnology field, “the rate-limiting 
step in issuing patents is no longer inventive output but the PTO itself.”143  
The study determined that the USPTO’s “maximum review capacity lags 
current application rates by hundreds of patents” across all biotechnology 
categories.144  This finding is crucial to the proposal of this Comment 
regarding fast-track examination vouchers.  With a lack of examiner 
resources, a voucher that would allow an inventor to get to the front of the 
examination line could be highly prized in an open market.  Such a lucrative 
commodity, transferrable to any willing purchaser in any industry, could be 
pivotal in incentivizing data and research tool sharing in the biotechnology 
field. 
Further strengthening the Adelman argument against the existence of an 
anticommons is the aforementioned diffuse ownership of biotechnology 
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patents, as evidenced by the “low averages for the number of patents 
received annually per assignee.”145  Over the fifteen year study, the average 
number of total biotechnology patents issued per assignee was roughly 
twelve, less than one patent per year, and approximately “fifty percent of 
assignees obtained no more than twenty-five patents . . . .”146  With this 
modest data in hand, it is plausible to “suggest that no single entity has the 
patent capital necessary to dominate biotechnology research and 
development.”147  While diffuse ownership would tend to require increased 
numbers of licenses to conduct research and development, Adelman 
suggests an anticommons does not play a role, as empirical studies show 
that no more than a “handful” of patents need to be licensed.148 
Adelman surmises that scientists cannot keep pace with the “explosion of 
new information” in the biotechnology field, suggesting that the 
opportunities “far exceed the capacities of the scientific community.”149  
Research scientists note that the need to license patents can be eliminated 
by following a parallel research path.  This parallel research path is what 
Peter Lee finds to be particularly beneficial to biotechnology progress even 
under an anticommons.150 
D. Benefits of an Anticommons in Biotechnology Research and 
Development 
Lee shifts his focus from applied science to patents’ effect on the 
“advancement of scientific theory, the scientific community’s conceptual 
understanding of the basic structure and properties of natural 
phenomena.”151  Lee finds benefits in the ability of patents to induce 
“paradigm shifts”; the “creation of a novel theoretical framework that better 
explains a particular set of natural phenomena . . . .”152  Shifting research 
frameworks may be a key to success in certain areas of disease research 
and treatment development, lending support to the argument that an 
anticommons is actually beneficial.  A strong field of patents can open the 
door to new avenues, “encouraging scientists to experiment outside the 
realm of mainstream research tools, encourag[ing] them to generate and 
test new theories.”153  An anticommons landscape may incentivize 
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researchers to “reconceptualize familiar natural processes” from a different 
reference frame that avoids prior art.154  The typical patent incentive shifts 
from receiving payments to an “incentive to innovate in order to avoid 
paying someone else and accepting exogenous constraints on one’s 
research.”155  It is suggested that this may be key to Alzheimer’s research.156  
“For a neuroscientist working on a treatment for Alzheimer’s disease, the 
exclusive patents on human embryonic stem cells provide an incentive not 
only to investigate alternate mechanisms for neurogenesis but also to test 
alternate theories of brain structure, physiology, and the pathology of 
Alzheimer’s itself.”157 
Patents can be seen as a “fulcrum defining the balance between two 
kinds of valuable scientific activity: hypothesis validation and exploration 
(comprising the main business of normal science) and hypothesis generation 
(leading to paradigm shifts).”158  Without evaluating this balance, discussion 
about changes to patent doctrine are “uniformed and incomplete.”159 
VI.  PAST PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE POSSIBLE ANTICOMMONS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
In order to overcome issues of a possible anticommons in biotechnology 
research, commentators have proposed various solutions.  However, many 
of the proposals could be too far-reaching, resulting in many unintended 
outcomes in industries outside of the biotechnology realm.  Protection under 
the patent law should be uniform for all technology sectors, yet several of 
the proposals could implement different rules for different technologies. 
A. Mandatory Data Release for Publicly-Funded Research 
Prior to publication of the Heller and Eisenberg article outlining the 
anticommons theory, the U.S. House of Representatives, meeting in July 
1997, proposed an appropriations bill amendment that would require 
researchers operating with government grants to make available to the 
public all of their raw medical and scientific data within ninety days of the 
first publication of any study results.160  Exempt from such disclosure 
requirements would be defense research and research where required 
disclosure would result in “economic harm to commercial proprietary 
 
 154. Id. at 686 (internal citations omitted). 
 155. Lee, supra note 25, at 687. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 665. 
 159. Id. 
 160. George D. Thurston, Mandating the Release of Health Research Data: Issues and 
Implications, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.  331, 331 (1997). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
358 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:341 
interests.”161  The initial proposal was in response to industry calls for data 
on air pollution studies;162 however the broad mandate would have had a 
major impact on biotechnology research, publication and patent strategies.  
The proposal was defeated but raised questions about the forced 
publication of government-funded research.163 
The foundation of the proposal, running against Bayh-Dole, was that the 
research was paid for by taxpayer-funded government grants and should 
therefore be placed in the public domain for any and all to critique and 
evaluate.164  While there could be benefits of increased validity through 
broader scrutiny, ethical and practical concerns were also raised.165  Forced 
data release could have an adverse effect on “(1) the scientific credibility of 
the research involved, (2) the confidentiality of research participants’ 
medical records, (3) the intellectual ownership of research ideas and their 
results, and (4) the speed of research progress in the medical and public 
health fields.”166 
While a mandatory data release program could “represent a major loss, 
professionally and financially” to researchers and organizations,167 this 
Comment’s proposed voluntary program of data sharing coupled with 
USPTO vouchers could overcome such financial loss.  Furthermore, the 
government views that its grants are simply that; they are not contracts that 
purchase the product of the grantee’s work, but are instead mechanisms to 
“support or stimulate activity which serves the public good.”168  This view 
aligns with Bayh-Dole and runs counter to the mandated data release 
proposal.  The proposed data release mandate could result in an overall 
slowing of biotechnological and medical research.169  Study participants 
could be less likely to apply for fear that their personal health information 
would be publicly available.170  The ninety day data release imposition 
would incentivize researchers to not publish study results until all research 
avenues are pursued, leading to a dearth of scientific publication in a 
particular field for years.171  The mandated data release proposal would 
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effectively stall scientific advancement by closing researchers off from the 
public and their colleagues in the scientific community.172 
However, a voluntary program incentivized by the USPTO, as proposed, 
could overcome some of these issues.  Working under a voluntary data 
release model, participants from the outset could be informed on how their 
personally-identifiable information, if any would be released.  Up-front 
voluntary agreements to openly share data could have the opposite effect as 
the mandated data release schedule.  Following ADNI, data would be 
released as soon as possible, giving all researchers access to larger data 
pools, spurring activity down alternate research paths. 
B. Mandatory Experimental Use Phase After Patent Issuance 
Leveraging the experimental use defense to patent infringement, some 
commentators see an expansion of that defense as a tool to overcome a 
possible anticommons in biotechnological research.173  Justice Story first 
hinted at an experimental use defense in his 1813 opinion in Whittemore v. 
Cutter.174  He stated that “it could never have been the intention of the 
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for 
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency 
of the machine to produce its described effects.”175  Successive courts have 
recognized the experimental use defense in the theoretical realm; however 
they have rarely been swayed to follow it in practice.176 
Lee calls for strengthening the experimental use defense into an 
operating, “robust” exception.177  The proposed exception would apply to 
any material or process that is defined by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) as a research tool.178  Such conforming technology would be granted 
a “research tool patent” where immediately after patent issue and for a finite 
period of time a “robust experimental use exception” would be in force.179  
During this finite period, any “noncommercial experimental use of the 
patented research tool would be permitted.”180  This broad definition of 
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experimental use would give safe haven to any use of a research tool that 
was not “intended to produce, or that did not actually produce, a 
commercial application.”181  Lee suggests that this finite time last for five 
years to allow for a balancing of time scientists need to perform and publish 
experiments using the patented tools, and the ability of the patentees to 
recoup their costs.182  After five years, the exception would expire and “any 
nonlicensed use of the patented material, even for experimentation with no 
direct commercial application, would constitute infringement.”183 
Such a proposal would foster similar goals as a voluntary data sharing 
collaboration by allowing “[f]ree access to research tools closely associated 
with an insurgent theory of natural causation . . . enabl[ing] members of the 
scientific community to engage in the crucial process of testing, refuting, 
and perhaps validating that theory.”184  However, this system would create a 
separate patent system for a separate technological group and as Lee 
admits, would “invert current legal frameworks of intellectual property.”185 
Lee’s proposal would grant open access to the patented research tool right 
from the beginning, close access once the exception expires and, following 
normal patent law, allow for unrestricted open use after the patent has 
expired.186 
While it is suggested that such a model would still incentivize 
innovation,187 it is expected that it would do just the opposite.  With patent 
term length being so important to patentees, such a proposal removes 
patent protection from at least the first quarter of the patent term.188  With 
the fast changes in biotechnology, by the time the patent protection 
“reattaches” to the patent, there may be little or no commercial value left in 
the patented technology.  While positing a default five year exception, Lee 
places the burden on Congress for determining the “optimal length” of the 
experimental use exception by exploring the “cost structure of creating new 
research tools, rates of research tool invention and obsolescence, and the 
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time horizon for conducting biomedical experiments.”189  However, such a 
detailed analysis of biotechnological research landscapes seem better suited 
for determination by the market and a traditional patent system without an 
experimental use exception.  By placing the final determination on whether a 
particular technology would receive a “research tool patent” in the hands of 
the USPTO, with possible input from the NIH,190 it is assumed that such a 
“research tool patent” would be mandatory for any qualifying application.  
Without mandatory participation, there would be few — if any— patent 
applicants who would chose to have an unenforceable patent for the first 
five years or more.  Overall, such a proposal seems inefficient at spurring 
biotechnological research growth by artificially weakening the patent 
through Congressional, rather than market, valuation of the research tool. 
C. Patent Prizes 
In an effort to overcome a detriment to distribution that the patent 
monopoly can present, some have called for the awarding of patent 
prizes.191  Patent prizes are most effective in the pharmaceutical realm where 
“a single successful patent is closest to being a successful product.”192  
Through direct investment in a patented technology, the patent prize 
operates as a pull mechanism on research193 by ensuring a market for a 
patented technology.194 The prize could further innovation by placing the 
intellectual property in the public domain or could operate as a subsidy of a 
particular patented technology or treatment.195  However, such a system 
carries issues of determining which patent deserves the prize, calculating the 
amount to be paid and determining the best “delivery method to stimulate 
innovation.”196 One author has suggested that the patent prize can be 
effective at bringing malaria treatments to market through aid organizations 
providing payment-per dose.197  The estimated payment commitment would 
be $3.1 billion and bestows the prize on the vaccine developer and 
increases the incentive to produce through the payment for every dose 
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delivered.198  Such an amount would be sufficient to provide research and 
development incentive while maintaining public health cost effectiveness.199 
D. Open Source Approaches to Biotechnology Research and Development 
Moving closer to the foundation of the proposed voluntary data sharing 
and patent voucher proposal of this Comment, is the call for applying open 
source ideals from the software industry to the biotechnology field.  
Returning to the most fundamental view of science, some view patent 
enforcement of scientific discoveries as being diametrically opposed to the 
“traditional scientific norms [that] call . . . for free dedication of new 
knowledge to the scientific community.”200  Moving away from a discourse 
on whether an anticommons exists and instead focusing on “identify[ing] 
and promot[ing] the wealth of intrinsic benefits associated” with an open 
source biotechnology model may be more productive.201 
A main issue of the current closed research system is the absence of 
motivation to replicate prior scientific experiments.202  There is little to be 
gained by scientists who wish to scrutinize work through replication; funding, 
recognition and publication are unlikely to result from such activities,203 
however beneficial they may be in confirming or altering biotechnological 
discoveries.  Especially during the paradigmatic shifts that may be required 
to solve the most complex diseases, open access to research data and 
discoveries can be key in order to challenge prior theories or offer 
alternative explanations.204  An open source model therefore facilitates 
scrutiny205 and helps to eliminate errors.206 With more eyes focused on the 
openly available research data and methods, higher quality research may 
result.207 
With greater scrutiny, open access “promotes scientific progress by 
permitting other scientists to use prior discoveries in subsequent 
research.”208  By allowing the free flow of data between collaborative 
researchers, an open source model will also likely bring about a “more 
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modular and effective coordination of research projects.”209  Within an 
open source research project, every user is a “potential source of new ideas 
for future directions in the product, and the workload for implementing 
change is shared between an expanded group of developers.”210  
Expanding the pool of researchers is especially important for large-scale 
research efforts such as the ADNI and its Parkinson’s follower.  The value of 
the massive amounts of data that these experiments generate is increased 
when “shared between various research groups, because sharing enables 
researchers to identify networks of genes or proteins that function in 
concert.”211  The successful human genome project, conducted through 
collaboration between sequencing centers located around the globe is a 
testament to how collaboration benefits the progress of science.212 
While some see an anticommons or patent thicket increasing transaction 
costs through RTLAs, open source research collaborations can reduce such 
costs.213  With data openly available, complex licensing agreements are not 
necessary, eliminating the costs of paying for the license and the time 
intensive negotiations involved in hashing out specifics.214  By dedicating 
data and research to the public domain, downstream negotiations and 
associated costs of internal and external IP access and patent protection are 
averted.215  Through placing data into community databases, scientists are 
given the tools to “quickly explore the links among genes, proteins, mRNAs, 
phenotypic data, RNAi data, microarray data,” and other biomarkers that 
are research critical.216  Such open, collaborative databases can spur 
innovation by reducing the time and associated costs that researchers spend 
on gathering information.217  Therefore, placing such patentable research in 
the public domain can avert an anticommons altogether.218 
The aforementioned open source collaborations built upon voluntary 
participation would likely perform much better than the previously noted 
robust experimental use exception or other compulsory licensing 
agreements.  Such compulsive measures require the government to carry 
out the difficult job of determining the proper compensation and can 
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contravene the “goals of the patent system to reward innovation.”219  
Therefore, the expansion of the USPTO proposed reexamination voucher 
program would provide an incentive to enter into voluntary open source 
research collaborations: leaving the value determinations to the research 
scientists interested in participating. 
VII.  FDA PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHER SYSTEM AND CRITICISMS 
While the debate on whether an anticommons exists in the 
biotechnology research and development field, a method of incentivizing 
research in the area of neglected diseases provides a foundation for the 
proposal of this Comment. 
To overcome a lack of financial incentive for pharmaceutical companies 
to invest money in developing neglected diseases that plague low-income 
countries, David Ridley, Henry Grabowski and Jeffrey Moe proposed a novel 
solution220 that was quickly adopted by the FDA.221  This solution comprised 
of a “priority-review voucher” granted to drug companies that developed 
drug therapies for diseases affecting low-income countries.222  To qualify for 
the proposed voucher the therapy was required to: 
(1) treat neglected diseases such as African trypanosomiasis, Chagas 
disease, leishmaniasis, or dengue fever; (2) receive approval by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products; (3) be clinically superior to existing 
treatments, (4) forgo patent rights; and (5) find at least one manufacturer for 
the product.223 
What provided the incentive was that upon meeting the above requirements, 
the granted voucher entitled the grantee to “priority FDA review for another 
drug (or possibly multiple drugs) and orphan tax credits.”224  Furthermore, 
the voucher would be completely transferrable on the open market.225 
Such a voucher could have the dual benefit of bringing successful drug 
therapies to neglected diseases while speeding access to “blockbuster” drug 
therapies in the developed world.226  Through the nexus of these two 
benefits, the drugs which could be most benefited by priority review will be 
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highlighted through the voucher market.227 The authors estimate that the 
value of an individual voucher could be worth upwards of $300 million for 
a blockbuster drug, in that it could decrease FDA review time by two-thirds, 
from an average of eighteen months to six months.228  While the priority 
review does not lower the safety and efficacy standards necessary to gain 
FDA approval, the proposed system would require more FDA resources and 
an increased cost of $1 million over a standard review.229  The authors 
proposed a user fee on the voucher that would cover such costs.230 
Another variant of the proposed FDA program would include a 
government-facilitated auction of the priority-review voucher to a drug 
manufacturer.231  This second option would eliminate the direct transfers 
from drug developer to manufacturer, but would still provide a payment 
incentive to the developer of a neglected disease treatment.232 
Both proposals include push and pull mechanisms to stimulate 
neglected areas of science and can easily be applied to areas of possible 
stagnation.  Push strategies can subsidize research inputs by decreasing 
research and development costs, while pull strategies work to incentivize 
research output through increasing financial returns.233 
On September 27, 2007, shortly after the above priority review voucher 
proposal, President George W. Bush signed into law the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments of 2007 (“FDAAA”).234  The bill added section 
524 to section 1102 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which authorized 
the FDA to award priority review vouchers to developers of therapies for 
specific enumerated tropical diseases.235  The bill also gives the 
Commissioner of the FDA power to make eligible for the voucher program 
“[a]ny other infectious disease for which there is no significant market in 
developed nations and that disproportionately affects poor and 
marginalized populations.”236  Included in the bill was the market incentive 
of transferable priority review vouchers first proposed by Ridley, Grabowski 
and Moe.237 
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Not included in the bill was a proposed pull mechanism of a 
“transferable patent exclusivity right.”238 Such transferable right would have 
granted a right to an extended patent term on a different product in return 
for licensing a product for a neglected disease.239  Senator Brownback (R-
Kansas) was pleased to see that such a provision for patent extensions for 
pharmaceuticals was not included, averting the “political divisiveness” that is 
appurtenant with such extensions.240  Previous proposed patent extensions 
on pharmaceuticals tended to limit the “rewards for innovation to those 
companies that possessed existing valuable patents and played havoc with 
generic manufacturers.”241  The proposed and adopted priority review 
voucher program overcomes this issue by giving any holder two valuable 
paths independent of prior patent ownership: using the voucher for internally 
developed treatments, or selling it to the highest bidder.242  “Allowing 
transferability of the vouchers and limiting the commitment of the innovators 
are the most significant features of the voucher program.”243 
A. Responses and Criticisms 
Despite avoiding the political mine field of patent extensions, the priority 
review voucher system is not immune to criticisms.  Considering the novelty 
of the system and the attendant uncertainties of the actual process, many 
large pharmaceutical firms are wary of participating until more specifics of 
the process are determined.244  Thus, those with the most to gain, the largest 
players with the deepest pockets, are waiting on the sidelines questioning 
“how the FDA will fit a standard application into a priority review voucher 
slot.”245 
Furthermore, others criticize the plan for not requiring the 
pharmaceutical company to make available the drug therapy as a 
contingency for obtaining the voucher.246  The proposed patent voucher 
program in this Comment would require dissemination of research data and 
discoveries in order to obtain the voucher. 
Until the market for the FDA vouchers is established and a confident 
value assigned to such vouchers, large pharmaceutical companies may not 
reallocate research capital to underserved and otherwise low-profit 
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diseases.247  The value of the voucher is wholly dependent upon the 
speculative value of a potential blockbuster drug.248  Therefore, some point 
to a disconnect between the incentive and innovation, which could result in 
an “inefficient and potentially dangerous way of encouraging research into 
tropical diseases.”249  The majority of pharmaceutical firms that develop 
drugs for tropical diseases tend to hold smaller drug portfolios and are 
unlikely to use their own vouchers.250  While this can facilitate the sale of the 
vouchers to large firms, such transfers could bring only marginal 
innovation.251  Furthermore, such transactions may be devoid of 
transparency whereby intellectual property transfers may result that increase 
costs and restrict access to subsequent therapies.252  Such outcomes may be 
detrimental to the entire goal of the FDA voucher program. Some fear that 
the priority review voucher program may lead to fast-track approval of drugs 
with “little or no clinical urgency” that are subjected to inadequate levels of 
FDA review.253 
VIII.  USPTO HUMANITARIAN REEXAMINATION VOUCHER SYSTEM 
With the FDA priority review voucher as a baseline, the USPTO 
proposed a similar voucher system on September 20, 2010 as a “pro-
business strateg[y] for incentivizing the development and widespread 
distribution of technologies that address humanitarian needs.”254  Seeing 
that “patents under reexamination are often the most commercially 
significant patents,” the USPTO proposed a fast-track ex parte 
reexamination voucher.255  Such a voucher would be a valuable incentive to 
investigate or make patented technologies available for humanitarian use 
since it would enable patent owners to reaffirm the validity of their patents in 
a more efficient and cost effect manner.256  Paralleling the FDA program, 
the proposed USPTO reexamination voucher could be used for any patent 
owned by the voucher grantee or could be sold on the open market.257 
Qualifying technologies need not be originally developed for humanitarian 
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needs; patent owners can broadly show “humanitarian uses [or research] of 
patented technologies” or “licensing [behavior] that address humanitarian 
needs.”258 
Reexaminations to which the fast-track voucher apply, would be elevated 
to the highest priority, wherein an examiner would process the 
reexamination as if it were next in the queue.259  Furthermore, the USPTO 
proposes a goal of accelerating reexamination time for fast-track 
reexaminations to six months.260  Shortening of the process is where the true 
value of the voucher may lay considering that the current timeframe for 
reexamination proceedings is nineteen to twenty months.261  A patent holder 
who wishes to use a fast-track voucher would not forfeit any “statutory and 
procedural rights, and would have the same time periods for filing 
responses and other communications as those under the existing 
procedure.”262 
A. Proposed Expansions to Incentivize Open Data Collaboration and 
Research Tool Sharing 
While the USPTO tracks closely to the FDA priority review voucher 
program, this Comment calls for an expansion of their proposal on several 
fronts.  First, looking to the success that ADNI has achieved in publicly 
sharing all of its gathered data, the proposal should include a provision for 
collaborative research and development efforts focused on challenging 
health issues (Alzheimer’s, cancer, Parkinson’s, Multiple Sclerosis, etc.) that 
are not restricted to neglected or humanitarian diseases.  However, the free 
and open exchange of research data and methods must be a key 
component of the research collaboration.  Further paralleling the ADNI, 
those entering the collaboration must give up all intellectual property rights 
on processes, methods, products, etc. that were developed during research.  
This would include any research data, cell lines, novel processes to develop 
cell lines, novel data extraction and analysis techniques, or any other 
patentable subject matter that resulted from the search for a particular 
biomarker or biological process that was the aim of the collaboration.  
However, the collaborators and wholly outside developers could still 
maintain an intellectual property right in any drug or therapy that resulted 
from the identified biomarkers, cell lines or processes.  The voucher would 
be an integral part in incentivizing researchers to give up their patent rights. 
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Second, the priority review voucher program should be expanded to 
vouchers for examination proceedings; going beyond the proposed 
reexamination proceedings.  Therefore, scientists or research organizations 
involved in qualified research collaborations (who gave up their initial right 
to file a patent on behalf of their work) would be able to apply the voucher 
to any drug or therapy that resulted from their research, independent of 
whether such was the result of the collaborative effort or other closed 
research.  Essentially, researchers would lose out on patent protection on 
early discoveries by entering the collaboration, but would obtain the right to 
jump to the front of the queue in any subsequent patent filing.  Since the 
United States patent term of twenty years begins at time of filing,263 the 
faster a patent application becomes an issued patent, the longer the 
effective patent monopoly the patent holder would be entitled.  Expanding 
the program to include fast-track examinations may require significant 
workforce expansions within the patent office.  This would be required to 
overcome the previously discussed issue of examiner saturation.264 However, 
the USPTO is currently engaged in an effort to increase examination 
capacity and efficiency.265 One step to achieving this goal is through 
workforce expansions of 1000 examiners in FY 2011 and FY 2012.266  With 
the signing into law of the America Invents Act (AIA), the USPTO now has 
the ability to determine its own fee structures267 which should help the Office 
in attaining its goal of workforce expansion. 
While allowing applicants to get to the front of the examination queue 
could be seen as more radical than a fast-tracked reexamination voucher, 
the USPTO already provides applicants options for prioritized 
examinations.268 A longstanding procedure, Section 708.02 of the Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedures allows for applicants to file a Petition to 
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Make Special asking for priority review of the patent application.269  
Currently there is a small entity petition available for biotechnology patents, 
however a fee is required.270  Under this proposed expansion of the USPTO 
reexamination voucher, an examination voucher would achieve a result 
similar to the biotech exception; however the voucher could be used by any 
entity, small or large, and would waive the associated fee.  Similarly, a 
prioritized examination procedure has been implemented in the USPTO.271  
The goal of the Prioritized Examination track (Track 1) is to “provide final 
disposition within twelve months of prioritized status being granted.”272  For 
the fiscal year of 2011, prioritized examination requests are limited to 
10,000; however the USPTO intends to reevaluate this number to determine 
future appropriate limits.273  Applicants wishing to have their applications 
processed through Track 1 must pay a $4000 fee, in addition to normal 
USPTO fees, for a total cost of $5,520 ($4,892 for small entities).274  Under 
this Comment’s proposed fast-track examination voucher system, a voucher 
holder would be able to waive the $4000 Track 1 Prioritized Examination 
fee, thus providing another incentive to enter into a data collaboration 
initiative.  Furthermore, the proposed program could exempt voucher-
holders from the 10,000 applicant limit or any future limits set by the 
USPTO, enhancing the market value for such vouchers. 
Similar to the USPTO proposal and the FDA program, the expanded 
examination voucher program would allow for sale of the vouchers on the 
open market.  The program could allow for purchasers of the voucher to be 
outside the realm of biotechnology.  Theoretically, an IBM, Boeing, or GE 
could purchase a fast-track examination voucher and apply it to a non-
biotechnology patent application.  Broadening the program to include 
examination vouchers could strengthen the market more than simply 
restricting it to reexamination vouchers.  There may be patent holders with 
few-if any-patents in reexamination proceedings that would otherwise benefit 
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from the line-cutting during the application phase that the examination 
voucher would provide.  A problem that could arise through broadening the 
market to non-biotechnology related firms and applications is that it may 
introduce uncertainty into the voucher market due to variations in voucher 
valuations.  The value of the voucher would most likely depend on what the 
patent applicant believes is the potential worth of their application and the 
value in having such application proceed through prosecution at a faster 
rate.  Patents from different industries would most definitely hold varied 
values, unlike the typical blockbuster drug that the FDA voucher is marketed 
toward.  Such uncertainty may stall the voucher market and the overall level 
of collaboration. 
The fast-track examination voucher could also become a defensive tool, 
especially in the pharmaceutical industry.  A pharmaceutical maker with a 
blockbuster drug that is nearing the end of its patent term may purchase a 
voucher simply to stall a competitor from entering the market.  By 
purchasing the voucher at a price the competitor cannot pay, the winning 
pharmaceutical maker will effectively force the losing competitor to either 
seek a fast-track voucher from another holder or proceed through patent 
prosecution at the normal rate. Large, profitable pharmaceutical companies 
may make an effort to purchase many vouchers, with no intention of using 
them, simply to hold competitors at a disadvantage.  While this may appear 
to be a failure of the voucher system, the goal of the program is still being 
met.  With voucher prices increased by companies looking for a competitive 
advantage, research collaborations become more enticing, resulting in 
more raw data and research tools available to the greater scientific 
community. 
By creating an incentive program based on voluntary participation, the 
patent system would not differ in its treatment of patent applications based 
on technology area like the mandatory experimental use exception stated 
above.275  Essentially, an issued patent that was prosecuted with a fast-track 
examination voucher would grant the patentee the same level of right of 
exclusion that any regularly prosecuted patent would afford.  Maintaining 
such uniformity would most likely eliminate any extra costs that might be 
associated with a government-mandated scheme or government backed 
patent prizes. 
Furthermore, granting a fast-track examination voucher would most 
likely introduce less controversy than the aforementioned patent term 
extensions.  If the voucher were instead used to extend the patent term, and 
could still be sold on the open market to any patentee in any industry, 
serious questions would most likely arise.  Should the extended term voucher 
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be applied with the initial patent application?  It should be considered 
whether the voucher be applied to a patent near the end of its term, so as to 
add additional time in the eleventh hour.  In addition, we must examine how 
the public could (or should) be notified of extended time applied to the 
patent.  Other issues include the length of the extension and whether the 
extended time should be proportional to the amount of data collaboration 
under which the voucher was first awarded.  By applying the voucher to the 
front of the process during the initial examination, these questions would not 
be raised.  A patent processed with a fast-track examination voucher would 
still be enforceable for a term of twenty years from application date. 
Finally, this proposed voucher system could help to avoid increased 
transaction costs.  With researchers voluntarily entering into data 
collaborations there would be no need for RTLAs as the data and research 
tools would be openly available.  With instant access to the latest research 
data, collaborators and outside scientists would not have to wait for license 
negotiations to be hammered out and could instead focus on efficiently 
moving their research forward. Open data sharing would eliminate research 
and development tollbooths and help to eliminate the aforementioned 
cognitive biases that overinflate the value of research data.276 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Looking to the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative as an 
example, incentivizing collaboration and data and resource sharing among 
research organizations can be an effective way to further the search for 
solutions to humanity’s most vexing diseases.  By utilizing a pull mechanism 
of a fast-track examination voucher to incentivize collaboration, the USPTO 
can play a vital role in such searches and can further fulfill its constitutional 
mandate of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”277  
Such an expansion of the proposed USPTO voucher program could operate 
more efficiently at alleviating an anticommons in biotechnology research 
and development, should one exist.  With participation being completely 
voluntary, the program could more closely attain the goals of an open 
source system than the previously proposed solutions.  The voluntary nature 
of the program would not require differing patent protection based on the 
technology area of the application; maintaining a uniform patent system for 
all applications.  This proposed fast-track examination voucher would 
dovetail well with current USPTO initiatives that allow the USPTO to better 
prioritize workload and accelerate examination times.278  The NIH is even 
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recognizing the need for programs like the proposed fast-track examination 
voucher.  Seeing that pharmaceutical companies “have neither the will nor 
the resources” to forge ahead with research in many areas, the NIH is 
injecting $1 billion into the new National Center for Advancing Translational 
Sciences.279  The goal of the new center is to complete as much research as 
necessary to entice pharmaceutical company investment.280  The activities 
could range from the initial screening of chemicals that might factor into a 
drug or cure to performing animal and human tests.281  Once the research 
achieves the requisite commercial appeal, the activities would be transferred 
from the “academic support line and into the private sector.”282  Thus, a 
fast-track patent examination voucher can be an integral part of a concerted 
effort to ensure the continued search for the keys to human health and well 
being. 
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